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ABSTRACT
As reinforcement learning algorithms are being applied to increasingly complicated and realistic tasks, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to solve such problems within a practical time frame. Hence, we focus on a satisficing strategy that looks for an
action whose value is above the aspiration level (analogous to the break-even point), rather than the optimal action. In this
paper, we introduce a simple mathematical model called risk-sensitive satisficing (RS) that implements a satisficing strategy by
integrating risk-averse and risk-prone attitudes under the greedy policy. We apply the proposed model to the K-armed bandit
problems, which constitute the most basic class of reinforcement learning tasks, and prove two propositions. The first is that RS
is guaranteed to find an action whose value is above the aspiration level. The second is that the regret (expected loss) of RS is
upper bounded by a finite value, given that the aspiration level is set to an “optimal level” so that satisficing implies optimizing.
We confirm the results through numerical simulations and compare the performance of RS with that of other representative
algorithms for the K-armed bandit problems.
Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL), a framework for learning and control in which agents search for proper actions in an environment
through trial and error, has witnessed rapid development in recent years, as evidenced by the super-human performances of deep
Q-networks (DQN)1 in video game playing and AlphaGo2 in the game of Go. Moreover, the application range of RL extends
not only to more complicated tasks on computers but also to the control of robots3 and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)4 in
the real world.
As RL algorithms are being applied to increasingly complicated and realistic tasks, the limits of sensors, processors, and
actuators of agents are posing serious obstacles for conventional optimization algorithms. Simon proposed the notion of
bounded rationality as the principle underlying agents’ behavior under resource limits5. A bounded rational agent may appear
to behave irrationally, but by considering the limits and constraints, the agent’s behavior can be understood as rational. Bounded
rationality has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Computational rationality6, which has been claimed to integrate
the three fields of neuroscience (brain), cognitive science (mind), and artificial intelligence (machine)7, is an updated form of
bounded rationality. Further, it has been proposed that abstraction and hierarchy, which have been considered to enable flexible
and efficient cognition of humans8, result from the above-mentioned limitations and are bounded rational9.
The representative decision making policy in the theory of bounded rationality is satisficing10, 11. Satisficing agents do
not keep searching for the optimal action; instead, they stop searching when an action whose quality is above a certain level
(aspiration) is found. The satisficing strategy has not attracted much attention in reinforcement learning, except for a few
studies12, 13 (to be discussed later). In previous studies14, 15, one of the authors proposed a simple satisficing value function
called risk-sensitive satisficing (RS) and empirically validated its effectiveness through numerical simulations of reinforcement
learning tasks.
In this paper, we apply RS to the K-armed bandit problems, which constitute the most basic class of reinforcement learning
tasks, and prove two propositions. First, we prove that RS is guaranteed to find a satisfactory action: if the RS agent chooses
an action in each trial and the number of trials is sufficient, the agent can stably choose an action whose value is above the
aspiration level. Second, we prove the finiteness of the regret of RS. In general, the performance of algorithms in the K-armed
bandit problems is measured by how small their regret (expected loss) is. It is known that the regret increases at least in the
logarithmic order with the number of trials16. Therefore, the regret increases infinitely as the trials are repeated. However,
we prove that if a small amount of information on the reward distributions is available so that the aspiration level is set to an
“optimal level” (hence, satisficing entails optimizing), then the regret of RS is upper bounded by a finite value. We confirm
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these results by numerical simulations and compare the performance of RS with that of other representative algorithms for
the K-armed bandit problems. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion on the possible applications of RS and the
theoretical significance of this work.
Methods
K-armed Bandit Problems
The K-armed bandit problems that we deal with in this paper are as follows. Let there be K actions {a1,a2, . . . ,aK} that lead to
a reward of 1 or 0 according to the reward probabilities {p1, p2, . . . , pK}, which are unknown to the agent. If the agent chooses
action ai, it acquires a reward of 1 with probability pi or a reward of 0 with probability 1− pi. The goal of the repetition of
choice is maximization of the expected accumulated rewards, which is measured by minimization of regret (the expected
cumulative loss). a∗i denotes the action with the maximal reward probability (i.e., pi∗ = maxi pi). The regret when the n-th step
(one step means one trial) ends is defined as follows.
regret(n) =
K
∑
i=1
(pi∗ − pi)E[ni(n)], (1)
where ni(n) is the number of times action ai is chosen from the first to the n-th step (simply written as ni when the number
of steps is not explicitly indicated) and E[ · ] is the expectation. Regret represents the expected loss, i.e., “how inferior the
cumulative expected reward from the actual chosen actions is to the cumulative expected reward when the optimal action
continues to be chosen from the first step?” The smaller the regret, the better is the performance of the algorithms. The
minimum value of the regret is zero when the optimal action has been chosen in all the steps. It has been proven that the regret
increases at least in O(logn) with the number of steps n16.
As for action selection by the agent, the basic policy is to take the action with the highest value (the greedy method). The
basic valuation of action ai is based on its mean reward:
Ei = n1i /(n
1
i +n
0
i ), (2)
where nri is the number of times ai is chosen and the reward r is acquired. ni, i.e., the number of times the action ai is chosen,
satisfies ni = n1i +n
0
i and n=∑
K
i=1 ni. Under the greedy method with the mean reward valuation, if there is a non-optimal action
ai (i 6= i∗) that has a high value in early trials, there is a risk of ai being chosen all along. Each of the other actions must be
tried for an appropriate number of times so that the optimal action is found in a timely manner. Merely choosing the action
with the highest value based on the accumulated knowledge (exploitation) does not suffice, and various actions must be tried
(exploration). Various algorithms have been proposed to balance exploitation and exploration.
Models of Satisficing
We introduce two models of satisficing at the levels of policy and value function. The policy model follows the standard
description of satisficing. The second model is the risk-sensitive value function that we analyze and test in this paper. The
former is tested through simulations for comparison with the latter.
Policy Satisficing (PS) Model
A standard definition of satisficing is to keep exploring until an action whose value is above the aspiration level R is found
and to then stop searching and keep choosing the action (exploit). Satisficing, unlike optimization, can reduce the search
cost because it does not involve searching for all actions and deciding on the optimal action. This is formulated as a policy
(of reinforcement learning) as follows. If there exists at least one action whose mean reward is above the aspiration level
R, exploitation (following the greedy method) is executed. Otherwise, when the mean reward of all the actions is below the
aspiration level R, an action is randomly chosen. We refer to this algorithm as policy satisficing (PS).
Risk-sensitive Satisficing (RS) Value Function
One of the authors has proposed a value function called risk-sensitive satisficing (RS) that realizes satisficing action selection
behavior when operated under the greedy policy14, 15 (see Supplementary Information for its relationship with other models).
Before introducing the model, we first define the difference between the mean reward Ei of action ai and the aspiration level R:
δi = Ei−R. (3)
If there exists a positive δi, then the agent will choose such ai and be satisfied; otherwise, it will be unsatisfied. RS is defined as
follows14:
RSi = niδi = ni(Ei−R). (4)
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This value is used under the greedy policy: the agent chooses the action ai with the maximal RSi value.
RS integrates two risk-sensitive satisficing behaviors. When unsatisfied, RS is risk-seeking, leading to optimistic exploration.
If δi < 0 for all i, then actions with smaller ni are prioritized. Let R = 0.7 and let there be two unsatisfactory actions a1 and a2
with E1 = 0.4 < E2 = 0.6 and n1 = 7,n2 = 2. Then, RS1 =−2.1 < RS2 =−0.2; hence, a2 is chosen. This preference of a less
tried action can be interpreted as the optimistic expectation of the action’s actual reward probability pi being set above R. There
might be some pi > R; however, thus far, Ei < R for all the actions. In terms of looking for a satisfactory action, it is rational to
try actions with smaller ni. This accords with the motto “optimism in the face of uncertainty,” which is considered a general
and rational exploration strategy in reinforcement learning17. The UCB model described later implements this idea18.
When satisfied, RS is risk-averse, performing pessimistic exploitation. If there is only one ai for which δi is positive, the
agent will keep choosing it. If there are multiple actions with positive δi, then the actions with larger ni are prioritized. Let
R = 0.3, and let there be two satisfactory actions a1 and a2 with E1 = 0.4 < E2 = 0.6 and n1 = 7,n2 = 2 that are equivalent to
the example above. Then, RS1 = 0.7 > RS2 = 0.6; hence, a1 is chosen. In this case, a more tried action is preferred. This can
be interpreted as the pessimistic expectation of the action’s actual reward probability pi being set below R. It is possible that ai
is a spuriously satisfactory action with Ei > R; however, pi < R. In terms of looking for a truly satisfactory action and avoiding
spuriously satisfactory ones, it is rational to try actions with Ei > R for a larger ni.
Setting of the Aspiration Level
The aspiration level R defines the boundary between satisfactory and unsatisfactory, analogous to the break-even point between
gain and loss or the neutral reference outcome in prospect theory19. It can be set according to the internal need for it or its
knowledge of the environment. As an ecological example, let the agent be an animal, and let the rewards 1 and 0 represent the
presence and absence of food. If the action is to look for food at a feeding ground from among multiple grounds and the agent
has to obtain food around once every two days for survival, then R would be 0.5 or higher.
Optimization can be viewed as a special case of satisficing. If R lies between the two reward probabilities of the optimal
and second-optimal actions, then satisficing above R means optimizing. Let us call such R “an optimal aspiration level”. Let the
highest reward probability be p1st and the second-highest one be p2nd. R can be set optimally as follows:
R = (p1st+ p2nd)/2. (5)
It is known that the regret increases at least in O(logn) with the number of steps n16. This is the result of assuming no
knowledge of the agent on the reward distribution. By relaxing this assumption and allowing R to be set as in Eq. 5, it will be
shown that the regret is upper bounded by a finite value as in Proposition 2 described later.
Note that having an optimal aspiration level does not make a K-armed bandit problem trivial. Even if we know a point
between the optimal and second-optimal actions, we do not know exactly which action is optimal. Efficient identification of
such an action is not trivial. In the next section, RS will be compared in terms of its performance with other algorithms, one of
which needs some similar information on the reward distribution to be optimal.
Results
Analysis
We perform theoretical analysis of the basic satisficing and optimizing properties of RS. First, in Proposition 1, we prove that
RS can stably choose actions above the aspiration level after a sufficient number of steps. Second, in Proposition 2, we prove
that the regret of RS is upper bounded when an optimal aspiration level is given and satisficing becomes optimizing.
Guarantee of Satisficing
In the proof of Proposition 1, we adopt symbols clearly indicating the step number (s) and the chosen action (ai) as follows.
Both of the following represent values after s steps: the mean reward
E(ai,s) =
n1i (s)
ni(s)
(6)
and the RS value
RS(ai,s) = ni(s) ·
(
E(ai,s)−R
)
. (7)
Proposition 1 (Theoretical Guarantee of Satisficing). Let pi be the reward probability of action ai (i = 1,2, . . . ,K). Let AU be
the set of actions whose reward probability is greater than the aspiration level R, and let AL be the set of actions whose reward
probability is smaller than R. Let IU = {i | pi > R}, IL = {i | pi < R} and AU = {ai | i ∈ IU}, AL = {ai | i ∈ IL}, where AU is
supposed to be a non-empty set. Then, the following holds for RS.
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After a sufficient number of steps, a satisfactory action ai with pi > R will be always chosen, and this state is stable.
In other words, by letting P(A) be the probability that event A will occur,
P
(
arg max
ai
RS(ai,s) ∈ AU
)
= 1 (s→ ∞). (8)
Subsequently, by N j =
{
s
∣∣∣ arg max
a
RS(a,s) = a j
}
, we denote the set of steps in which action a j is chosen. Let #N be the
number of elements in set N. First, we prove two claims.
Claim A.
∀ i ∈ IL, P
(
#Ni = ∞⇔ RS(ai,s)→−∞ (s→ ∞)
)
= 1. (9)
Proof. (Claim A) (⇐) Suppose that i ∈ IL and RS(ai,s)→−∞ (s→ ∞). If #Ni < ∞, RS(ai,s) is constant for s greater than or
equal to some number. This is a contradiction; hence, we have #Ni = ∞. (⇒) Suppose that i ∈ IL and #Ni = ∞. By the law of
large numbers, for any positive number ε , there exists some S such that we have P
(|E(ai,s)− pi|< (R− pi)/2)> 1− ε for
any integer s ∈ Ni greater than S. Now, if |E(ai,s)− pi|< (R− pi)/2, we have
RS(ai,s) = ni(s) ·
(
E(ai,s)−R
)
< ni(s) ·
(
pi+
R− pi
2
−R)
= ni(s) · pi−R2 < 0. (10)
As s→ ∞, we have ni(s)(pi−R)/2→−∞; hence, RS(ai,s)→−∞. Therefore, P
(
RS(ai,s)→−∞
∣∣ #Ni = ∞)> 1− ε . Since
ε is arbitrary, we obtain P
(
RS(ai,s)→−∞
∣∣ #Ni = ∞)= 1.
Claim B.
∃i ∈ IU , P(#Ni = ∞) = 1. (11)
Proof. (Claim B) We assume that for any i ∈ IU , #Ni < ∞. Then, for any i ∈ IU , RS(ai,s) is constant for any s greater than or
equal to some number. Furthermore, for some j ∈ IL, we have #N j = ∞. Hence, by Claim A, we have
P
(∃ j ∈ IL, RS(a j,s)→−∞ ∣∣ ∀i ∈ IU , #Ni < ∞)= 1. (12)
However, the following statements contradict each other: (i) RS(a j,s)→−∞, (ii) ∀i ∈ IU , RS(ai,s) = const. for any s greater
than or equal to some number. Hence, we obtain
P
(∃ j ∈ IL, RS(a j,s)→−∞ and ∀i ∈ IU , #Ni < ∞)= 0. (13)
Now, the following formula holds.
P
(∃ j ∈ IL, RS(a j,s)→−∞ and ∀i ∈ IU , #Ni < ∞)
= P
(∃ j ∈ IL, RS(a j,s)→−∞ ∣∣ ∀i ∈ IU , #Ni < ∞)P(∀i ∈ IU , #Ni < ∞). (14)
Therefore, we must have P(∀i ∈ IU , #Ni < ∞) = 0.
Proposition 1 (again).
P
(
arg max
ai
RS(ai,s) ∈ AU
)
= 1 (s→ ∞). (8)
Proof. (Proposition1) By Claim B, we have ∃k ∈ IU , #Nk = ∞. By the law of large numbers, for any positive number ε ,
there exists some S such that we have P
(|E(ak,s)− pk|< (pk−R)/2)> 1− ε for any integer s ∈ Nk greater than S. Now, if
|E(ak,s)− pk|< (pk−R)/2, we have
RS(ak,s) = nk(s) ·
(
E(ak,s)−R
)
> nk(s) ·
(
pk +
R− pk
2
−R)
= nk(s) · pk−R2 > 0. (15)
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Hence, we have P
(
for sufficiently large s, RS(ak,s) > 0
)
> 1− ε . Since ε is arbitrary, we obtain P(for sufficiently large s,
RS(ak,s)> 0
)
= 1.
Here, we assume that there exists i ∈ IL such that #Ni = ∞. Then, we may have RS(ai,s)→−∞ by Claim A. On the other
hand, #Ni < ∞ follows from RS(ai,s)→−∞ because RS(ak,s)> 0 for any sufficiently large s. However, #Ni = ∞ and #Ni < ∞
contradict each other, which means that the initial assumption must be false. Hence, for any i ∈ IL, P(#Ni < ∞) = 1 holds.
Therefore, the results obtained are summarized as ∃k ∈ IU , P(#Nk = ∞) = 1 and ∀i ∈ IL, P(#Ni < ∞) = 1. From these results,
the following follows immediately. P
(
arg max
ai
RS(ai,s) ∈ AU
)
= 1 (s→ ∞).
Theoretical Analysis of Regret
We prove that RS is upper bounded by a finite value when the level R is set to the optimal aspiration level.
Proposition 2 (Finiteness of Regret of RS). Let the highest reward probability of all the actions be p1 and the second-highest
reward probability be p2. Further, we set R as R = (p1+ p2)/2 (an optimal aspiration level). Then, the following holds for RS:
“There exists a monotonically increasing function f (s) for step number s such that regret(s)< f (s). Then, f (s)→M (s→ ∞),
where M is constant. Thus, regret(s)< M”.
We conceived the following proof by referring the papers20–22 on TOW (tug-of-war) dynamics model (hereinafter simply
referred to as TOW). TOW is similar to RS (See Supplementary Information for the similarities and differences between RS
and TOW). However, in their paper, the analysis of the finiteness of the regret by TOW was strictly limited to cases in which
there are only two actions and the variances of the reward probabilities are equal. In the case of the bandit problems with the
reward following the Bernoulli distributions, equal variance implies p1 = p2 or p2 = 1− p1. (Let Vi be the variance of action ai.
V1 =V2⇔ p1(1− p1) = p2(1− p2)⇔ (p1− p2){1− (p1+ p2)}= 0⇔ p1 = p2 or p2 = 1− p1.) Thus, the equal variance is
a strong assumption. Here, we generalize the proof to prove finite regret with K arms (K ≥ 2) and without assuming equal
variance.
Proof. (Proposition2) Suppose that p1 > p2 > pi (i 6= 1,2). Let RS(ai,s) = ni(s) ·
(
E(ai,s)− R
)
(i = 1,2, . . . ,K). The
expectation E and the variance V of RS(ai,s) are E[RS(ai,s)] = ni(s) (pi−R) and V [RS(ai,s)] = ni(s)σ2i , respectively, where
σ2i = pi(1− pi).
Note that
RS(ai,s) = ni(s) ·
(
E(ai,s)−R
)
= n1i (s)−ni(s)R
= (Xi,1−R)+(Xi,2−R)+ · · ·+(Xi,ni(s)−R) (16)
holds, where Xi, j = 1 or 0, indicating the reward when action ai was chosen in the j-th time. Let ∆RSi(s) = RS(a1,s)−
RS(ai,s) (i 6= 1). Then,
E[∆RSi(s)] = n1(s)(p1−R)−ni(s)(pi−R)
= {(p1− pi)/2}(n1(s)+ni(s))
+{(p1+ pi)/2−R}(n1(s)−ni(s)). (17)
V [∆RSi(s)] = n1(s)σ21 +ni(s)σ
2
i . (18)
Since (p1+ p2)/2 = R,
E[∆RSi(s)] = {(p1− pi)/2}(n1(s)+ni(s))
+{(pi− p2)/2}(n1(s)−ni(s)). (19)
By Proposition 1, if the step number s is sufficiently large, then n1(s)→ s with probability 11.
1This is an approximation. Also, it is not mathematically strict to fix ni(s) when calculating the expected value and the variance of RS(ai,s), and to assume
that the trials are independent, when applying the central limit theorem. It is possible that the calculated upper bound of the regret is not accurate due to the
errors resulting from the approximation and/or the above-mentioned assumption. However, the validity of the upper bound is empirically confirmed as shown
in Fig. 1 and 2.
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Hence,
E[∆RSi(s)] = {(p1− pi)/2}s+{(pi− p2)/2}s
= {(p1− p2)/2}s. (20)
V [∆RSi(s)]≤ (n1(s)+ni(s))σ21,i ≤ sσ21,i,
where σ1,i = max(σ1,σi). (21)
By Eq. (16) and the central limit theorem, ∆RSi(s) follows the normal distribution with expectation E[∆RSi(s)] and
variance V [∆RSi(s)]. The probability that ∆RSi(s)< 0 is Q(E[∆RSi(s)]/
√
V [∆RSi(s)]). Here, Q(x) is the Q-function, which
represents the tail distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Thus, Q(x) = (1/
√
2pi) · ∫ ∞x exp(−t2/2)dt. Let
P[s = n+1, I = i] be the probability that action ai is chosen in the (n+1)-th step.
Then, P[s = n+1, I = i] is given by
P[s = n+1, I = i]≤ P[RS(a j,n)≤ RS(ai,n) (∀ j 6= i)]
≤ P[∆RSi(n)≤ 0] (22)
= Q
(
E[∆RSi(n)]√
V [∆RSi(n)]
)
≤ Q
(
(p1− p2)
√
n
2σ1,i
)
= Q(φi
√
n), (23)
where we set φi = (p1− p2)/(2σ1,i).
By using the Chernoff bound Q(x)≤ (1/2)exp(−x2/2), we evaluate the upper bound of the regret.
E[ni(n)] =
n−1
∑
t=0
P[s = t+1, I = i]
≤
n−1
∑
t=0
Q(φi
√
t)
≤ 1
2
+
n−1
∑
t=1
1
2
exp
(
−φ
2
i
2
t
)
≤ 1
2
+
∫ n−1
0
1
2
exp
(
−φ
2
i
2
t
)
dt
=
1
2
− 1
φ 2i
(
exp
(
−φ
2
i
2
(n−1)
)
−1
)
(24)
→ 1
2
+
1
φ 2i
(n→ ∞). (25)
Therefore,
regret(n) =
K
∑
i=1
(p1− pi)E[ni(n)]
≤
K
∑
i=1
(p1− pi)
{
1
2
− 1
φ 2i
(
exp
(
−φ
2
i
2
(n−1)
)
−1
)}
(26)
→
K
∑
i=1
(p1− pi)
(1
2
+
1
φ 2i
)
(n→ ∞). (27)
This concludes the proof.
When the Aspiration Level R is Variable
Both of Propositions 1 and 2 assumed that the aspiration level R is constant. When R is variable or stochastic, similar
propositions can be established just by slightly modifying the previous proofs assuming that R is within a certain range. See
Supplementary Information C for the modifications. The generalization assures that the upper bound of regret stays finite even
when R is not initially set p2 < R < p1 but converges within p2 < R < p1 after some finite time step.
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Figure 1. Simulations of RS with K = 2, where the reward probabilities are (0.51,0.49) or (0.501,0.499). (a) Plot of
accuracy and (b) plot of regret. The dotted line at the top represents the upper bound of the regret calculated by Proposition 2.
Empirical Verification
We verify the proven properties through simulations. As in Proposition 2, R = (p1+ p2)/2, where p1 > p2 > pi (i 6= 1,2). All
the results below are the averaged results of 1,000 simulations. As an additional performance index, we consider accuracy,
which is the proportion of the simulations in which the algorithm chose the optimal action in each step. Thus, the accuracy in
the t-th step is as follows.
accuracy = (Number of times action a1 with the highest reward probability p1 is chosen in the t-th step) / (Total number of
simulations).
First, we test whether the difference in reward probabilities can be detected, even if the difference is small, when the optimal
aspiration level is set for RS. We test it with K = 2 where (p1, p2) = (0.51,0.49), (0.501,0.499). The result is shown in Fig. 1.
The dotted line at the top in Fig. 1 (b) represents the upper bound of the regret shown by Proposition 2. We see that the accuracy
nearly reaches 1 after 106 steps, even if the difference is only 0.002 as in (0.501,0.499). Moreover, we see that the regret does
not exceed the upper bound (Eq. (27)) calculated by Proposition 2.
Next, we conduct simulations to confirm the propositions with K = 10. The reward probability of each action is generated
uniformly randomly from [0,1]. The result is shown in Fig. 2. We can see that the accuracy converges to 1 and the regret does
not exceed the upper bound (Eq. (27)) calculated by Proposition 2. Here, the calculated upper bound of the regret for K = 10 is
considerably higher than the actual regret compared with the case of K = 2. As we evaluate the probability of choosing action
ai only by comparing ai with action a1 having the highest reward probability as shown in Eq. (22) in the proof of Proposition 2,
the probability of choosing ai is increasingly overestimated as the number of actions increases.
Comparison with Other Algorithms
Here, we clarify the performance and properties of RS by comparing it with some representative algorithms for the K-armed
bandit problems, namely UCB1-Tuned and εn-greedy18
UCB1-Tuned
Upper confidence bound (UCB) is an algorithm based on the idea that the value of relatively less tried actions (more uncertain)
is potentially high, similar to RS’s risk-seeking evaluation when unsatisfied18. The regret of UCB is guaranteed to increase in
the logarithmic order, which is the theoretical limit16. We include the result of UCB1-Tuned (hereinafter referred to as UCB1T),
which shows better performance compared to UCB1.
UCB1T(ai) = Ei+
√
lnn
ni
min{1
4
,Vi(ni)} . (28)
Here, Vi(ni) = vi +
√
2lnn/ni, and vi is the variance of the reward from choosing action ai. Further, 1/4 is the upper bound
of the variance of the random variable following the binomial distribution. In the algorithm, the action with the highest
UCB1T value is chosen (the greedy method). The first term Ei of UCB1T, which is the mean reward, represents the already
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Figure 2. Simulations of RS with K = 10, where the reward probabilities are each generated uniformly randomly from [0,1]
in each simulation. (a) Plot of accuracy and (b) regret. The dotted line at the top shows the upper bound of the regret calculated
by Proposition 2.
acquired knowledge (and its exploitation), whereas the second term, which decreases as action ai is tried more, expresses the
(un-)reliability of Ei (which leads to exploration). When ni = 0, the second term cannot be calculated, but in the first K steps,
each action is chosen once so that the value of the second term for all the actions is subsequently finite.
εn-greedy
To set the level R such that satisficing implies optimization, it is necessary to have some point in the interval between the highest
and second-highest reward probabilities, usually unknown to the agent. Thus, having such “optimal” R is a type of “cheating”.
However, when such information is available, it should be utilized well, and RS does so.
Furthermore, there is another algorithm, namely εn-greedy18, which requires similar information for optimal performance.
In this algorithm, the probability of random action selection, εn, is gradually reduced by annealing so that the regret of εn-greedy
is guaranteed to be of the logarithmic order. It starts with maximal exploration (random action selection) and then gradually
shifts to more exploitation as the information of the environment gets accumulated. In εn-greedy, there are two parameters c
and d that are set as c > 0 and 0 < d < 1. When there are K arms, the stepwise decreasing sequence εn ∈ (0,1], n = 1,2, . . . is
defined as follows:
εn = min
{
1,
cK
d2n
}
. (29)
The agent chooses action ai with the highest mean reward with probability 1− εn, and it chooses a random action with
probability εn for n = 1,2, . . . Let p1st be the highest reward probability, and define ∆i = p1st− pi. Then, the parameter d needs
to satisfy
0 < d ≤ min
i6=1st
∆i. (30)
Further, min∆i = p1st− p2nd needs to be known in advance. Thus, some information about the reward probabilities is required,
as in the case of RS with the optimal aspiration level. In addition, the performance of εn-greedy is sensitive to the value of the
parameter c > 0, and it is difficult to find the optimal value of c18.
On the other hand, determining the optimal aspiration level R for RS may be easier. It does not require a parameter like c,
and (p1st+ p2nd)/2 is sufficient. More generally, it is sufficient to obtain the interval [p2nd, p1st] or the value of any point within
the interval.
Existing Satisficing Models
Here, we introduce the existing satisficing models and briefly explain the difference between those models and RS. First, the
framework that is the closest to ours is that of Bendor et al. on the heuristics of satisficing12, which analyzes the two-armed
bandit problems when the rewards are Bernoulli distributed. They mainly analyzed the limiting behavior of the policy model
similar to PS. Their model is different from PS in that it gives a probability parameter of switching actions with a certain
probability (not always), when unsatisfied. Therefore, the performance of their model is lower than that of PS.
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Figure 3. Simulations with K = 100, where the reward probabilities were sampled uniformly. Comparison of RS, UCB1T, PS,
and εn-greedy: (a) accuracy and (b) regret.
The most recent and comprehensive study was conducted by Reverdy et al.13 They decomposed satisficing into “satisfy”
and “suffice” (from which the word “satisfice” is formed) and presented general problem settings that include the standard
bandit problems and algorithms with optimal order. As their algorithm is an adaptation of the standard UCB18, the difference
between RS and their algorithm is similar to the difference between RS and UCB as described above. Furthermore, their
analysis is limited to the bandit problems where the reward distributions are Gaussian. In their study, they extended the concept
of regret and developed an algorithm that searches for actions that exceed the aspiration level with probability (1−δ ). They
proved the finiteness of the regret for their algorithm when δ > 0.
However, it should be noted that in their study, the definition of regret is changed. Specifically, the regret of their algorithm
is calculated according to whether or not the expected reward exceeds the aspiration level with probability (1−δ ), and the
definition that regards the regret occurring with probability δ as zero is adopted. If δ = 0, their regret is calculated according to
whether the expected reward always exceeds the aspiration level or not; therefore, it becomes the same framework as that of the
ordinary bandit problems. In such cases, the regret of their algorithm increases in the logarithmic order, which is the theoretical
limit, and it does not become finite. On the other hand, RS can achieve the finite regret without changing the definition of regret.
Therefore, the purposes and problem settings are different in our study and their study.
According to the above-mentioned discussion, it is difficult to compare our study with other satisficing algorithms for
reinforcement learning proposed in previous studies because the purposes and frameworks are different. It is sufficient to
compare our approach with PS and UCB1. Accordingly, the other algorithms will not be handled directly hereafter.
Performance Comparison
We compare the performance of UCB1T, PS, εn-greedy, and RS with K = 100 through numerical simulations. Furthermore,
the reward probabilities are uniformly randomly selected from [0,1], and the average is over 1,000 simulations. As mentioned
above, it is difficult to determine the parameter c of εn-greedy. In this simulation, the regret of εn-greedy in the 10,000-th step
is taken as a reference. It is empirically found by a long parameter sweep such that the regret of εn-greedy in the 10,000-th step
is minimized at around c = 1×10−5. Hence, the results of c = 1×10−6,1×10−5,1×10−4 are shown as comparison targets.
We set d as d = p1st− p2nd. As for RS and PS, we set the aspiration level R to an optimal level, R = (p1st+ p2nd)/2, so that we
can evaluate the efficiency when satisficing implies optimization.
The results are shown in Fig. 3. As for accuracy, RS approaches 1 the fastest among these algorithms. As for regret, PS
increases rapidly because it randomly chooses actions unless an action whose reward is above R is found. The regret of RS
remains small (and bound finitely), whereas UCB1T and εn-greedy diverge at a logarithmic order. In summary, we can see that
RS with the optimal aspiration level R shows better performance than UCB1T, PS, and εn-greedy.
Analysis of the Expected Change in Value Functions
Here, we qualitatively consider why RS with the optimal aspiration level R performs better than the other algorithms. Let us
consider how the value of RS in the n-th step changes when action ai is chosen in the (n+ 1)-th step. In the following RS
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formula,
RS(ai,n) = ni(n) · (E(ai,n)−R) = n1i (n)−ni(n)R, (31)
n1i (n) is the number of times a reward of 1 is obtained in the choice of action ai from the first to the n-th step. In the (n+1)-th
step, the value of RS changes with probability pi to
RS(ai,n+1) = n1i (n)+1− (ni(n)+1)R = RS(ai,n)+1−R, (32)
whereas it otherwise changes with probability (1− pi) to
RS(ai,n+1) = n1i (n)− (ni(n)+1)R = RS(ai,n)−R. (33)
Let ∆RS(ai,n) = RS(ai,n+1)−RS(ai,n). Then, the expected value of the change, E[∆RS(ai,n)], is as follows:
E[∆RS(ai,n)] = pi(1−R)+(1− pi)(−R) = pi−R. (34)
Thus, we see that the following relationships hold in any step:
If pi > R then E[∆RS(ai,n)]> 0, (35)
If pi < R then E[∆RS(ai,n)]< 0. (36)
Let R be set to an optimal level. Then, relationship 35 means that once the optimal action ai is chosen, RS(ai) will keep
increasing on average, and it will continue to be chosen. On the other hand, relationship 36 means that if a non-optimal action
a j has the highest RS value, and continues to be chosen for a while, then the value keeps decreasing on average. The value for
other actions remains invariant. Therefore, at some point, another action than a j will start to be chosen. Further, note that the
RS value decreases at an average rate of p j−R. Therefore, on average, the lower the reward probability of an action, the faster
the action will stop being chosen, and another action will start being chosen.
To clarify the idiosyncrasies of RS, we carry out similar analyses for other value functions. First, let us analyze the mean
reward. The value function is Q(ai,n) = n1i /ni(= Ei). When action ai is chosen, E[∆Q(ai,n)] is given by
E[∆Q(ai,n)] = pi
(
n1i +1
ni+1
− n
1
i
ni
)
+(1− pi)
(
n1i
ni+1
− n
1
i
ni
)
=
pini−n1i
(ni+1)ni
=
pi−Ei
ni+1
, (37)
whereas the values for other actions do not change. Further, E[∆Q(ai,n)] is positive if pi > Ei and negative if pi < Ei, and both
cases may occur regardless of the reward probability pi because Ei is a variable, in contrast to the constant R for RS. If action
ai is chosen for a sufficient number of times, pi ≈ Ei holds. Then, it leads to E[∆Q(ai,n)] ≈ 0, and Q(ai,n) remains nearly
unchanged. This implies that there is a possibility that a non-highest action keeps to be chosen (trapped into a local optimum).
Let us consider the simplest example where there are only two actions (with p1 > p2), and choosing the optimal action a1 does
not give much rewards, leading to E1 < p2 and E1 < E2. As n2 increases, E2 converges to E2 ≈ p2, and the relationship of
E1 < E2 becomes fixed because of E1 < p2. This leads to a2 being chosen constantly. To avoid the local optima, εn-greedy
prevents a non-highest action from being continuously chosen by randomly choosing actions with probability εn. With the
mean reward, unlike RS, we cannot say that the smaller the reward probability of the action chosen once, the faster on average
is the switching of the agent to choose another action.
Next, let us analyze UCB1, which is the simplest algorithm in the UCB family.
UCB1(ai,n) = Ei+
√
2lnn
ni
. (38)
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When action ai is chosen, the expected change in the UCB1 value is
E[∆UCB1(ai,n)] = pi
{
n1i +1
ni+1
+
√
2ln(n+1)
ni+1
−
(
n1i
ni
+
√
2lnn
ni
)}
+(1− pi)
{
n1i
ni+1
+
√
2ln(n+1)
ni+1
−
(
n1i
ni
+
√
2lnn
ni
)}
=
pini−n1i
(ni+1)ni
+
(√
2ln(n+1)
ni+1
−
√
2lnn
ni
)
=
pi−Ei
ni+1
+
(√
2ln(n+1)
ni+1
−
√
2lnn
ni
)
, (39)
whereas the expected change of non-chosen action a j is as follows:
E[∆UCB1(a j,n)] = E j +
√
2ln(n+1)
n j
−
(
E j +
√
2lnn
n j
)
=
√
2
n j
(
√
ln(n+1)−
√
lnn). (40)
In Eq. (39), the first term is the same as that in Eq. (37). In Eq. (39), the second and third terms approach zero if action ai
continues to be chosen. Hence, if we consider only Eq. (39), there is a possibility that the non-highest action continues to
be chosen, as with Eq. (37). However, in UCB1, the value function of non-chosen action a j also changes, as in Eq. (40).
Moreover, we can see that the value of the non-chosen action increases infinitely because of the second term of Eq. (38). As a
result, a non-highest action does not continue to be chosen.
In Eq. (39), the first term is positive if pi > Ei and negative if pi < Ei, and both cases may occur regardless of the reward
probability pi because Ei is a variable, as it is for Q above. On the other hand, the second term between the parentheses
is negative if n ≥ 3, which results from the fact that f (x) = (lnx)/x monotonically decreases with x > e(> 2). As a result,
E[∆UCB1(ai,n)] may be positive or negative, regardless of the reward probability. Therefore, UCB1 does not have the property
of RS whereby the action with a lower reward probability will be switched from earlier.
Based on the analyses presented above, let us reconsider the form of RSi = niδi = ni(Ei−R). Starting from the most
basic value function of the mean reward, Ei, RS is formed through two operations, (·)−R and ni(·). If it is merely δi, the
value function δi works exactly as the original Ei under the greedy policy. On the other hand, if only ni(·) is applied, the
value function is niEi = n1i , and it is a special case of RS with R = 0 where any action is satisfactory. With niEi, the agent
will continue to choose the first action that gives a reward of 1. By applying the two operations, we acquire the property of
E[∆RS(ai,n)] = pi−R, the constant change in the RS value, regardless of the step number n. Therefore, the RS value of an
unsatisfactory action (with the reward probability below the aspiration level) constantly decreases on average; as a result, the
action will cease to be chosen at some point. Furthermore, we can say that the smaller the reward probability of the action
chosen once, the faster on average is the switching of the RS agent to the choice of other actions. As shown above, UCB and
εn-greedy have no such property. Therefore, this property is considered to be one of the reasons why the performance of RS
using the optimal aspiration level is superior to that of other basic algorithms.
Discussion
In this paper, we introduced a simple model called RS that implements a satisficing strategy for the K-armed bandit problems,
which constitute one of the most basic classes of reinforcement learning tasks. We proved two propositions. One is that RS
is guaranteed to find a satisfactory action with the reward probability above the aspiration level. The other is that the regret
(expected loss) of RS is upper bounded by a finite value when an optimal aspiration level (where satisficing implies optimizing)
is given. Then, we confirmed the results through numerical simulations and compared the performance of RS with that of
other representative algorithms for the K-armed bandit problems. In addition, we analyzed the property of RS relative to other
algorithms and validated why RS has its own form.
Except in Proposition 1, we assumed that we can set the aspiration level R to an optimal level. As the optimal aspiration
is not always available to the agent, a future research direction would be to develop an algorithm that can learn an optimal
aspiration level R online. As a preliminary result, an algorithm that exploits the properties of RS has shown performance
comparable to that of Thompson sampling23, although it has not been theoretically guaranteed thus far24.
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There are many other advantages of RS besides those mentioned in this paper. For example, the satisficing behavior is
scalable in the sense that its performance does not depend on the scale of the problems, such as the number of actions, but
rather on the proportion of satisfactory actions, unlike optimization algorithms15. In addition, as RS is a simple value function
without assumptions such as the family of reward probability distributions, it can be applied to other reinforcement learning
tasks through some straightforward generalization. In fact, it has been shown that the generalized RS can conduct autonomous
and efficient searches in a robotic motion learning task in which a robot learns to perform giant swings (acrobot)14.
One of the computational advantages of satisficing, compared to optimization, is that it can convert an optimization problem
into a decision problem. With RS, the guaranteed satisficing algorithm, and R at a certain level, we can efficiently determine
whether there is an action whose value is above R. The decision framework is especially useful when a certain level of reward,
rather than the optimal level, is necessary. It also facilitates parallelization. For example, we can set the aspiration levels
R1,R2, . . . ,RN to N agents in ascending order, respectively, and make the agents execute a certain task in parallel. If the task
succeeds at the level Ri and fails at the level Ri+1, we can see that the optimal solution exists somewhere in [Ri,Ri+1], and the
interval may be incrementally narrowed down. This is somewhat close to human learning for solving a task. When trying
to solve a task, we usually do not randomly try and err in a purely bottom-up manner. Instead, we tend to adopt a top-down
constraint in our trials, such as trying to run one mile in four minutes. Guaranteed satisficing may lead to reinforcement learning
methods that solve tasks somewhat similarly to humans.
References
1. Mnih, V. et al. Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature 518, 529–533, DOI: 10.1038/nature14236
(2015).
2. Silver, D. et al. Mastering the game of go with deep neural networks and tree search. Nature 529, 484–489, DOI:
10.1038/nature16961 (2016).
3. Muse, D. & Wermter, S. Actor-critic learning for platform-independent robot navigation. Cogn. Comput. 1, 203–220, DOI:
10.1007/s12559-009-9021-z (2009).
4. Zhao, F., Zeng, Y., Wang, G., Bai, J. & Xu, B. A brain-inspired decision making model based on top-down biasing of
prefrontal cortex to basal ganglia and its application in autonomous uav explorations. Cogn. Comput. 10, 296–306, DOI:
10.1007/s12559-017-9511-3 (2018).
5. Simon, H. A. Models of Man: Social and Rational (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1957).
6. Lewis, R. L., Howes, A. & Singh, S. Computational rationality: Linking mechanism and behavior through bounded utility
maximization. Top. Cogn. Sci. 6, 279–311, DOI: 10.1111/tops.12086 (2014).
7. Gershman, S. J., Horvitz, E. J. & Tenenbaum, J. B. Computational rationality: A converging paradigm for intelligence in
brains, minds, and machines. Science 349, 273–278, DOI: 10.1126/science.aac6076 (2015).
8. Tenenbaum, J. B., Kemp, C., Griffiths, T. L. & Goodman, N. D. How to grow a mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction.
Science 331, 1279–1285, DOI: 10.1126/science.1192788 (2011).
9. Genewein, T., Leibfried, F., Grau-Moya, J. & Braun, D. A. Bounded rationality, abstraction, and hierarchical decision-
making: An information-theoretic optimality principle. Front. Robotics AI 2, 27, DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2015.00027 (2015).
10. Simon, H. A. A behavioral model of rational choice. The Q. J. Econ. 69, 99–118, DOI: 10.2307/1884852 (1955).
11. Simon, H. A. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychol. Rev. 63, 129–138, DOI: 10.1037/h0042769
(1956).
12. Bendor, J. B., Kumar, S. & Siegel, D. A. Satisficing: A ’pretty good’ heuristic. The B.E. J. Theor. Econ. 9, DOI:
10.2202/1935-1704.1478 (2009).
13. Reverdy, P., Srivastava, V. & Leonard, N. E. Satisficing in multi-armed bandit problems. IEEE Transactions on Autom.
Control. 62, 3788–3803, DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2016.2644380 (2017).
14. Takahashi, T., Kohno, Y. & Uragami, D. Cognitive satisficing: Bounded rationality in reinforcement learning. Transactions
Jpn. Soc. for Artif. Intell. 31, AI30–M 1–11 (in Japanese), DOI: 10.1527/tjsai.AI30-M (2016).
15. Oyo, K. & Takahashi, T. Optimization through satisficing with prospects. In AIP Conference Proceedings, vol. 1863,
360013, DOI: 10.1063/1.4992542 (2017).
16. Lai, T. L. & Robbins, H. Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules. Adv. Appl. Math. 6, 4–22, DOI: 10.1016/
0196-8858(85)90002-8 (1985).
12/16
17. Bubeck, S. & Cesa-Bianchi, N. Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problems. Foundations
Trends Mach. Learn. 5, 1–122, DOI: 10.1561/2200000024 (2012).
18. Auer, P., Cesa-Bianchi, N. & Fischer, P. Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem. Mach. Learn. 47, 235–256,
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013689704352 (2002).
19. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211, 453–458, DOI:
10.1126/science.7455683 (1981).
20. Kim, S.-J., Aono, M. & Nameda, E. Efficient decision-making by volume-conserving physical object. New J. Phys. 17,
083023, DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/17/8/083023 (2015).
21. Kim, S.-J. et al. Decision maker based on atomic switches. AIMS Mater. Sci. 3, 245–259, DOI: 10.3934/matersci.2016.1.245
(2016).
22. Kim, S.-J. & Takahashi, T. Performance in multi-armed bandit tasks in relation to ambiguity-preference within a learning
algorithm. Front. Appl. Math. Stat. 4, 27, DOI: 10.3389/fams.2018.00027 (2018).
23. Agrawal, S. & Goyal, N. Analysis of thompson sampling for the multi-armed bandit problem. In Proceedings of the 25th
Annual Conference on Learning Theory, 39.1–39.26 (2012).
24. Kono, Y. & Takahashi, T. Autonomous optimal exploration through satisficing. In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual
Conference of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, 1Z3–04 (in Japanese) (2018).
25. Shinohara, S., Taguchi, R., Katsurada, K. & Nitta, T. A model of belief formation based on causality and application to
n-armed bandit problem. Transactions Jpn. Soc. for Artif. Intell. 22, 58–68 (in Japanese), DOI: 10.1527/tjsai.22.58 (2007).
26. Nakano, M. & Shinohara, S. Necessity and possibility of the symmetry bias: How can we model human unconscious
thinking? Cogn. Stud. 15, 428–441 (in Japanese), DOI: 10.11225/jcss.15.428 (2008).
27. Takahashi, T., Oyo, K. & Shinohara, S. A loosely symmetric model of cognition. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 5778, 238–245,
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-21314-4 30 (2011).
28. Oyo, K. & Takahashi, T. An application of causal value function for the exploration–exploitation dilemma and its
bayesian analysis. In Proceedings of The 27th Annual Conference of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, 2013,
1L4–OS–24b–4 (in Japanese) (2013).
29. Oyo, K., Ichino, M. & Takahashi, T. Cognitive validity of a causal value function with loose symmetry and its effectiveness
for n-armed bandit problems. Transactions Jpn. Soc. for Artif. Intell. 30, 403–416 (in Japanese), DOI: 10.1527/tjsai.30.403
(2015).
30. Oyo, K., Kohno, Y. & Takahashi, T. Application of human cognitive bias to nonstationary n-armed bandit problems. In
Proceedings of The 25th Annual Conference of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, 2011, 1G1–2in (in Japanese)
(2011).
31. Kohno, Y. & Takahashi, T. Loosely symmetric reasoning to cope with the speed-accuracy trade-off. In SCIS-ISIS 2012,
1166–1171 (2012).
32. Kim, S.-J., Aono, M. & Hara, M. Tug-of-war model for the two-bandit problem: Nonlocally-correlated parallel exploration
via resource conservation. Biosystems 101, 29–36, DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2010.04.002 (2010).
Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17H04696.
Author contributions statement
T.T. and A.T. conceived the analyses. A.T. conducted the proofs and experiments. Both the authors wrote and reviewed the
manuscript.
Additional information
Competing interests: The authors declare no competing interests.
13/16
Supplementary information
In this supplementary material, two distinctive aspects of RS and a generalization of the two propositions in the main text are
discussed. First, we show that RS can be considered as a generalization of another model, S025. S0 in the bandit setting is based
on the premise that high performance can be achieved through competitive evaluation of actions. However, our generalization
from S0 to RS shows that competitive evaluation appears only in the two-armed settings, and in general (in the K-armed settings),
the fundamental is the risk-sensitive satisficing behavior. Second, we compare RS with the Tug-of-war (TOW) dynamics
models20–22, which was referred to in the proof of Proposition 2. TOW is based on the notion of conservation of physical
quantities, and it leads to competitive evaluation. We show that, under certain conditions, RS has the same mathematical form
as a part of the recent TOW dynamics models. In addition, S0 and TOW are both limited in terms of their application to the
evaluation of only two actions (or two classes of actions). On the other hand, as materialized in RS, the notion of risk-sensitive
satisficing enables generalization (to an arbitrary number of actions), simplification, conceptual clarity, and high performance
in terms of satisficing, as suggested in the main text of the paper. Third, we slightly generalize Propositions 1 and 2 and their
proofs in the main text assuming that the aspiration level R is within a certain range.
A. RS as a generalization of S0
First, we show that RS is a generalization of another value function S0, from the number of actions K = 2 to arbitrary K ≥ 2 and
from constant aspiration level 0.5 to variable R ∈ [0,1]. RS discussed in this paper was formerly called reference satisficing14, 15.
It was subsequently renamed as risk-sensitive satisficing to characterize it more specifically, and abbreviated invariantly as RS.
RS contains S0 model in a special form, which was first introduced by Shinohara et al. as a causal reasoning model25. The S0
model was later termed as the RS (rigidly symmetric) model26, and was then used as a value function27 in the bandit problems.
Subsequent studies applied S0 in the two-armed bandit problems, and the performance of S0 was found to be similar to that of
LS27, which is a more complicated model. An analysis of these behaviors from a satisficing perspective was first published in
201328, 29. The aspiration level for satisficing was made variable in 201130. Subsequently, in 201231, its generalization from
two to any arbitrary number of actions of the model was proposed. However, LS is much more complicated than RS, and the
analysis was rather indirect. Hereafter, we show the equivalence of RS and S0 under certain conditions (for two actions with
R = 0.5).
Let A and B be actions in a two-armed bandit problem. Let a1X be the number of times the choice of action X ∈ {A,B} has
given reward 1, and let a0X be the number of times the choice of action X has given reward 0 (no reward). Thus, the mean
reward is a1X/(a
1
X +a
0
X ). Here, S0 defines the values of actions A and B as follows:
S0(A) =
a1A+a
0
B
a1A+a
0
B+a
0
A+a
1
B
, (41)
S0(B) =
a1B+a
0
A
a1B+a
0
A+a
0
B+a
1
A
. (42)
These comparative evaluations identify both the obtaining of reward from action A and not obtaining of reward from action B.
Hence, S0(B) = 1−S0(A) holds. Because the denominator is common, the comparison of the two values eventually results in
the selection of action A if the following inequality holds; if the inequality does not hold, action B is selected:
a1A+a
0
B > a
1
B+a
0
A. (43)
From the above inequality, we can see that transitive law is established when adding action C. That is, let the S0 evaluation of A
in comparison with B be represented as S0AB(A). If S0AB(A)< S0BA(B) and S0BC(B)< S0CB(C), then S0AC(A)< S0CA(C) .
Thus, we see that the comparable number of actions is not necessarily K = 2. The inequality (43) can be expressed as
a1A−a0A > a1B−a0B. (44)
Using the notations presented in this paper, a1X = nX EX and a
0
X = nX (1−EX ) holds. Then,
nAEA−nA(1−EA)> nBEB−nB(1−EB) (45)
⇔ nA(2EA−1)> nB(2EB−1) (46)
⇔ nA(EA−0.5)> nB(EB−0.5). (47)
It can be seen that both sides of inequality (47) are identical to the form of RS (equation (4) in the main article) with R = 0.5.
Because the value of a set of arbitrary actions can be totally ordered thanks to the property of transitivity, it is only necessary to
calculate the RS value for each action, independently of all the other actions, and choose the action with the maximum value.
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B. Comparison of RS and TOW
We referred to the TOW dynamics model20–22 (hereafter simply referred to as TOW) in the proof of Proposition 2. Here, we
compare RS and TOW, and describe the relative advantages of RS over TOW. There are many variations of TOW, starting from
around 201032. Here, we focus on recent papers 21, 22 where the proposed model of TOW is the closest to that of RS. Let Xk,i be
a random variable, representing the reward obtained by the i-th choice of the action k. Something like the value of action k in
TOW can be expressed as
Sk = Xk,1+Xk,2+ · · ·+Xk,nk −Knk
= (Xk,1−K)+(Xk,2−K)+ · · ·+(Xk,nk −K), (48)
where K is a parameter.
Let nk be the number of time action k is chosen, and Ek be the average rewards obtained by choosing action k, such that
Ek = ∑
nk
i=1 Xk,i/nk. Although in the main text of the paper, the probability distributions of the rewards were assumed to be the
Bernoulli distributions, herein, the distribution does not necessarily have to be Bernoulli. The value function RSk of the action k
of RS is equivalent to the following form, as given in the proof of Proposition 2:
RSk = nk(Ek−R)
=
nk
∑
i=1
Xk,i−nkR
= (Xk,1−R)+(Xk,2−R)+ · · ·+(Xk,nk −R). (49)
When parameter K in (48) is interpreted as the aspiration level R in equation (49), RS has the same mathematical form as a part
of the recent TOW dynamics models under certain conditions. Hence, the regret calculation of TOW can be applied to RS as
well, and the regret of RS also is upper bounded like TOW. In this work, we relaxed the assumption of equal variance in the
proof for TOW.
However, there exist certain differences between RS and TOW. The primary difference is that they model totally different
phenomena. RS is modeled on how humans make decisions (satisficing), while taking into account the associated risks.
Moreover, as explained in Supplementary information A, RS is also a generalized model of S0 model in causal reasoning.
On the other hand, TOW is derived from physical laws like volume conservation. An advantage of RS over TOW lies in its
simplicity, clarity, and generalizability. As regards clarity, RS is the product of “reliability of obtained information” and “degree
of satisficing,” and the parameter R is associated to “aspiration.” On the other hand, the interpretation of the parameter K of
TOW, which corresponds to R in RS, is not necessarily clear. Therefore, through straightforward generalization of these two
constituent concepts, RS need to be applied not only to the K-armed bandit problems (instead of two-armed) but also generally
to reinforcement learning settings14.
C. Propositions 1 and 2 When the Aspiration Level R is Variable
Both of Propositions 1 and 2 assume that the aspiration level R is constant. When R is variable or stochastic, similar propositions
can be established just by slightly modifying the previous proofs assuming that R is within a certain range. We show only the
changes made in Proposition 3 from Proposition 1, and in Proposition 4 from 2. In the proofs below, the symbols are the same
as Propositions 1 and 2 except for the ones specified below. Let the minimum and the maximum of the variable aspiration level
R be Rmin and Rmax, respectively.
Proposition 3 (Modified Proposition 1 for Variable Aspiration Level R). We assume that the both of AU and AL are invariant
even if the aspiration level R changes temporally or stochastically. More specifically, we assume that pl <Rmin ≤R≤Rmax < pu
holds, where pl and pu are the maximum of the reward probabilities in AL and the minimum of the reward probabilities in AU ,
respectively. Under this assumption, Proposition 1 is established as it is.
Proof. The proof of Claim A for Proposition 1 needs to be changed as follows in the part where the law of large numbers
is used. For any positive number ε , there exists some S such that we have P
(|E(ai,s)− pi| < (Rmin − pi)/2) > 1− ε
for any integer s ∈ Ni greater than S. Now, if |E(ai,s)− pi| < (Rmin− pi)/2, we have RS(ai,s) = ni(s) ·
(
E(ai,s)−R
)
<
ni(s) ·
(
pi+(Rmin− pi)/2−Rmin
)
= ni(s) · (pi−Rmin)/2 < 0. Hereafter the proof is the same as that of Claim A in Proposition
1. The proof of Claim B needs no change.
The proof of Proposition 1 needs to be similarly changed as follows. For any positive number ε , there exists some S such that
we have P
(|E(ak,s)− pk|< (pk−Rmax)/2)> 1−ε for any integer s∈Ni greater than S. Now if |E(ak,s)− pk|< (pk−Rmax)/2,
we have RS(ak,s) = nk(s) ·
(
E(ak,s)−R
)
> nk(s) ·
(
pk +(Rmax− pk)/2−Rmax
)
= nk(s) · (pk−Rmax)/2 > 0. Hereafter the
proof is the same as that of Proposition 1.
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Proposition 4 (Modified Proposition 2 for the Variable Aspiration Level R). We assume that the aspiration level R satisfies
p2 < Rmin ≤ R≤ Rmax < p1, even if the aspiration level R changes temporally or stochastically. Under this assumption, we can
still prove that the regret is upper bounded by a finite value.
Proof. Let RS(ai,s) = ni(s) ·
(
E(ai,s)−R
)
(i = 1,2, . . . ,K). Here, we define RSbd(a1,s) as follows: RSbd(a1,s) = n1(s) ·(
E(a1,s)−Rmax
) ≤ n1(s) · (E(a1,s)−R) = RS(a1,s). Also, we define RSbd(ai,s) for i 6= 1, as follows: RSbd(ai,s) = ni(s) ·(
E(ai,s)−Rmin
)≥ ni(s) · (E(ai,s)−R)= RS(ai,s). The suffix bd means using the boundary of the aspiration level R. If we
let Ri = Rmax (i = 1),Rmin (i 6= 1), then, we have RSbd(ai,s) = ni(s) ·
(
E(ai,s)−Ri
)
(i = 1,2, . . . ,K).
The expectation E and the variance V of RSbd(ai,s) are E[RSbd(ai,s)] = ni(s)(pi−Ri) and V [RSbd(ai,s)] = ni(s)σ2i , respec-
tively, where σ2i = pi(1− pi). Let ∆RSi(s) = RS(a1,s)−RS(ai,s) (i 6= 1), and ∆RSbd,i(s) = RSbd(a1,s)−RSbd(ai,s) (i 6= 1).
Note that ∆RSi(s)≥ ∆RSbd,i(s) holds because RS(a1,s)≥ RSbd(a1,s) and RS(ai,s)≤ RSbd(ai,s) (i 6= 1).
E[∆RSbd,i(s)], which is the expectation of ∆RSbd,i(s), is evaluated as follows:
E[∆RSbd,i(s)] = n1(s)(p1−Rmax)−ni(s)(pi−Rmin)
= n1(s)(p1−Rmax)+ni(s)(Rmin− pi)
≥ n1(s)(p1−Rmax)+ni(s)(Rmin− p2) (∵ i 6= 1, p2 ≥ pi)
≥ (n1(s)+ni(s))min
(
(p1−Rmax),(Rmin− p2)
)
(∵ p1−Rmax > 0,Rmin− p2 > 0). (50)
By Proposition 3, if the step number s is sufficiently large, then n1(s)→ s with probability 1 (the same approximation
as in the proof of Proposition 2, hence the same note applies). Hence, E[∆RSbd,i(s)] ≥ s · min
(
(p1−Rmax),(Rmin− p2)
)
.
Also, V [∆RSbd,i(s)] of the variance of ∆RSbd,i(s) is evaluated as follows: V [∆RSbd,i(s)] ≤ (n1(s)+ ni(s))σ21,i ≤ sσ21,i, where
σ1,i = max(σ1,σi).
By the central limit theorem, ∆RSbd,i(s) follows the normal distribution with expectation E[∆RSbd,i(s)] and variance
V [∆RSbd,i(s)]. The probability that ∆RSbd,i(s)≤ 0 is Q(E[∆RSbd,i(s)]/
√
V [∆RSbd,i(s)]). Then, P[s = n+1; I = i], which the
probability that action ai is chosen in the (n+1)-th step, is given by
P[s = n+1, I = i]≤ P[RS(a j,n)≤ RS(ai,n) (∀ j 6= i)]
≤ P[∆RSi(n)≤ 0]
≤ P[∆RSbd,i(n)≤ 0] (∵ ∆RSi(s)≥ ∆RSbd,i(s))
= Q
(
E[∆RSbd,i(n)]√
V [∆RSbd,i(n)]
)
≤ Q
(√
n ·min((p1−Rmax),(Rmin− p2))
σ1,i
)
= Q(φi
√
n), (51)
where we set φi = min
(
(p1−Rmax),(Rmin− p2)
)
/(σ1,i). Hereafter the proof is the same as that of Proposition 2. As a result,
the upper bound of regret is obtained by replacing φi in Eq. (27) with φi set in Eq. (51).
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